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Abstract
Publicly-traded companies have the power to pass sunlight bylaws to address hedge fund
activism. Sunlight bylaws would require activist hedge funds to publicly disclose any strategic
proposals and their financial interests in companies earlier and at thresholds lower than current se-
curities laws. Sunlight bylaws would also require disclosure of additional information, including:
(1) the percentage of the fund’s portfolio invested in the company; (2) the fund manager’s com-
pensation; (3) the fund manager’s investment in the fund; (4) the fund’s portfolio turnover; and
(5) the fund’s prior holding periods after any announcements of an ownership interest and a strate-
gic proposal. Academic proponents of hedge fund activism defend activism based on the theory
that activist hedge fund managers are systematically better agents for long-term stockholders than
the incumbent board and executive management. These proponents argue that fund managers have
large stakes in their funds, the funds’ profitability is highly contingent on the financial performance
of its investments, and the funds hold relatively few concentrated investments. Sunlight bylaws
would target factual information essential to that claim and require its disclosure in succinct, sum-
mary form. Sunlight bylaws would also state that if a stockholder violates them, that stockholder
cannot nominate a candidate for a seat on the board or propose any issue for the next stockhold-
ers’ vote. But institutional investors and proxy advisory firms support hedge fund activism in the
abstract, and a board that passed a sunlight bylaw might precipitate litigation or a proxy fight. Pub-
lic companies should therefore, on a case-by-case basis, request the same or similar information
when an activist that has held shares for a brief period of time makes a strategic proposal. Public
companies should negotiate confidential treatment of any disclosures for a period of time so that
the activist can reap the full benefit of the short-term increase in share price after the disclosure of
its investment and strategic proposal some academics and institutional investors think necessary
to incent activism. But public companies should also make very clear that they reserve the right
to publish any questions that the activist refuses to answer or for which it insists on confidential
treatment. And the other stockholders, who likely invest over longer timeframes, should carefully
consider any information that the activist discloses—or, equally importantly—refuses to disclose.
KEYWORDS: Hedge Funds
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ABSTRACT 
Publicly-traded companies have the power to pass sunlight bylaws to 
address hedge fund activism. Sunlight bylaws would require activist 
hedge funds to publicly disclose any strategic proposals and their 
financial interests in companies earlier and at thresholds lower than 
current securities laws. Sunlight bylaws would also require 
disclosure of additional information, including: (1) the percentage of 
the fund’s portfolio invested in the company; (2) the fund manager’s 
compensation; (3) the fund manager’s investment in the fund; (4) the 
fund’s portfolio turnover; and (5) the fund’s prior holding periods 
after any announcements of an ownership interest and a strategic 
proposal. Academic proponents of hedge fund activism defend 
activism based on the theory that activist hedge fund managers are 
systematically better agents for long-term stockholders than the 
incumbent board and executive management. These proponents 
argue that fund managers have large stakes in their funds, the funds’ 
profitability is highly contingent on the financial performance of its 
investments, and the funds hold relatively few concentrated 
investments. Sunlight bylaws would target factual information 
essential to that claim and require its disclosure in succinct, 
summary form. Sunlight bylaws would also state that if a 
stockholder violates them, that stockholder cannot nominate a 
                                                                                                                 
* Ms. Mead is a shareholder at Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, 
P.A. and thanks the following individuals for helpful comments on earlier drafts: Marc 
Wolinsky, Martin Lipton, John Huber, Guhan Subramanian, Eugene Stearns, David 
Marcus, Garrett Moritz, Andrea Nathan, and Anthony Casey.  Rachel Purcell provided 
valuable research assistance.  The author is a member of the Florida bar and a member 
of the New York bar but not a member of the Delaware bar.  All views and any errors 
are the author’s. 
480 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
candidate for a seat on the board or propose any issue for the next 
stockholders’ vote. 
But institutional investors and proxy advisory firms support hedge 
fund activism in the abstract, and a board that passed a sunlight 
bylaw might precipitate litigation or a proxy fight. Public companies 
should therefore, on a case-by-case basis, request the same or similar 
information when an activist that has held shares for a brief period of 
time makes a strategic proposal. Public companies should negotiate 
confidential treatment of any disclosures for a period of time so that 
the activist can reap the full benefit of the short-term increase in 
share price after the disclosure of its investment and strategic 
proposal some academics and institutional investors think necessary 
to incent activism. But public companies should also make very 
clear that they reserve the right to publish any questions that the 
activist refuses to answer or for which it insists on confidential 
treatment. And the other stockholders, who likely invest over longer 
timeframes, should carefully consider any information that the 
activist discloses—or, equally importantly—refuses to disclose. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 481	
I. THE DEBATE OVER ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS .................................. 487	
A. INCREASES IN SHARE PRICE SURROUNDING ACTIVIST HEDGE 
FUNDS’ DISCLOSURES ............................................................. 488	
B. THE DEBATE OVER SHORT-TERMISM ........................................ 491	
C. THE RISE OF WOLF PACKS ........................................................ 499	
II. ENHANCING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 
13(D) ............................................................................................. 501	
III. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS WOULD REVEAL NECESSARY 
INFORMATION .............................................................................. 503	
A. OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSED SUNLIGHT BYLAWS ....................... 503	
B. SUNLIGHT BYLAW DISCLOSURES WOULD ANSWER KEY 
QUESTIONS ABOUT ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS ........................... 505	
C. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS COULD IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF 
ACTIVIST PROPOSALS .............................................................. 506	
IV. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS ARE FACIALLY VALID .................................. 507	
A. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING FACIAL VALIDITY ..................... 508	
B. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS ARE AUTHORIZED BY DGCL SECTION 
109(B) ..................................................................................... 509	
1. The Text Authorizes Sunlight Bylaws ................................. 509	
2. Sunlight Bylaws Are Process-Oriented .............................. 510	
2016]                              TWO NEW TOOLS FOR                               481 
ADDRESSING ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS 
C. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
DGCL SECTION 202 ............................................................... 511	
D. A CHALLENGER COULD NOT SHOW SUNLIGHT BYLAWS 
WOULD NEVER OPERATE LAWFULLY ..................................... 512	
V. A SUNLIGHT BYLAW AND A HYPOTHETICAL AS-APPLIED 
CHALLENGE ................................................................................. 512	
A. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DUPONT ........................................... 512	
B. THE DUPONT HYPOTHETICAL ................................................... 514	
1. Detection of the Activists ................................................... 514	
2. What a Sunlight Bylaw Might Have Revealed ................... 515	
3. DuPont’s Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws ........... 517	
4. Validity of the Sunlight Bylaw As Applied ......................... 518	
5. A Rights Plan ..................................................................... 524	
VI. RECIPROCAL DISCLOSURES AS A FIRST STEP ............................... 525	
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 530	
 
INTRODUCTION 
Activist hedge funds have repeatedly invested in public companies, 
successfully pushed for the adoption of their strategic proposals, and 
then exited within one or two years. Companies can enact sunlight 
bylaws, which would require such funds to disclose online any such 
proposal within one day and to disclose any direct and indirect financial 
interest in the company above 5%. Other information bearing on the 
fund’s incentives, such as the fund manager’s compensation, the fund 
and fund manager’s compensation based on performance and the 
amount of money managed, the percentage of the fund’s assets the 
investment represents, and the fund’s portfolio turnover, would also be 
disclosed. If an activist hedge fund violated the sunlight bylaw, its 
strategic proposal or director nominee could not be proposed for a 
stockholder vote without board approval. 
But support from a public company’s institutional stockholders for 
a sunlight bylaw may often be lacking, and a sunlight bylaw may 
precipitate litigation or a proxy fight. Thus, public companies should 
begin, as a first step, by requesting that any activist making a strategic 
proposal also make voluntary, reciprocal disclosures in response to the 
same questions posed by sunlight bylaws. The public company could 
make the activist’s disclosures confidential for a period of time. That 
would enable the activist to realize the entire short-term gain caused by 
its disclosure of a strategic proposal and investment and should not 
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reduce an activist’s short-term profits. The public company, in its 
request for reciprocal disclosure, should also make clear that it can 
publish to stockholders any questions the activist refuses to answer, any 
questions that it has agreed to answer only confidentially, the terms of 
any negotiated confidentiality agreement, and the activist’s refusal to 
update answers. 
Part I of this Article outlines the debate over activist hedge funds.1 
An activist hedge fund typically identifies a target company it deems 
ripe for intervention, buys shares in the open market, and then publicly 
announces its beneficial ownership and a strategic proposal by making a 
filing under the securities laws. 2  Research has shown about a 5% 
increase in the company’s share price in the twenty days up to and 
including the activist’s disclosure, followed by about a 2% increase in 
share price in the next twenty days. 3  Lead activists frequently 
communicate with other hedge funds while acquiring a financial interest 
in the company, and those other funds acquire their own interests and 
support the lead activist’s strategic proposal. 4  Hedge funds acting 
collectively have been dubbed “wolf packs.” 
Proponents of activist hedge funds claim that hedge fund managers 
have strong incentives to boost short-term share price and systematically 
make proposals that increase both net present value and long-term value. 
They assert that hedge fund managers’ compensation depends highly on 
performance, hedge funds hold few concentrated investments, and hedge 
funds use derivatives and other financial instruments to amplify their 
investments. They assume that the hedge fund managers’ incentives are 
systematically stronger than the company’s executive management and 
directors’ incentives to increase share price. 
In response, many with enormous practical experience, such as 
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine, corporate lawyer 
Martin Lipton, and Blackrock Chairman and CEO Laurence Fink, point 
to activist hedge funds’ short average holding periods of one or two 
years in the company’s stock and high portfolio turnover to argue that 
hedge funds’ focus on short-term returns can harm long-term value.5 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See infra Parts I, V.A. 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. See infra Part I.C. 
 5. See infra Part I.B. 
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They claim that activists often force cuts in long-term investments like 
research and development in favor of financial engineering that boosts 
share price in the short-term to the detriment of net present value and 
long-term value.6 
Empirical studies accepted for publication about activists’ 
intervention and long-term value conducted by those who defend hedge 
fund activism have shown that over the five years following activist 
hedge fund interventions firm value sometimes increases and sometimes 
decreases.7 Other studies have shown that activist interventions decrease 
research and development spending and long-term return on assets.8 
Part II describes the debate surrounding activists’ current disclosure 
obligations under the federal securities laws. 9  Section 13(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) requires activists 
to publicly report any strategic proposals ten days after acquiring over a 
5% beneficial ownership of a company’s outstanding shares, but does 
not count derivatives or short positions toward that threshold.10 Activists 
have increased their ownership up to as much as 27% in the ten days 
between hitting the reporting threshold and the disclosure deadline. In 
part because activists in modern financial markets can increase their 
stake so quickly, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz petitioned the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to require 
large stockholders to report any strategic proposals a day after acquiring 
a financial interest above 5%, counting derivative ownership structures 
and short positions.11 The SEC has yet to act on that petition. 
But since that petition was filed, the disclosure issues have become 
more acute. Activists now frequently coordinate in wolf packs where 
each member owns a smaller stake. Thus, many members of the wolf 
pack never reach the Section 13(d) disclosure threshold and never need 
to disclose their net economic positions in the company’s stock. They 
could even take undisclosed net short positions.12 And although public 
companies must disclose material information about their decision-
                                                                                                                 
 6. See infra Part I.B. 
 7. See infra Part I.B. 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Parts I.C, II. 
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makers’ compensation and interests in the stock, hedge funds have no 
parallel disclosure requirements. Directors and other stockholders can 
only guess at any hedge fund’s investment as a percentage of its 
portfolio, portfolio turnover, prior holding periods, fund managers’ 
compensation, and the ownership interests held by a wolf pack based on 
spotty public reporting. Thus, the activist defenders’ assertions about 
hedge fund managers’ incentives cannot be tested, and the facts bearing 
on those incentives are unknown and unknowable in any activist 
campaign. 
Part III outlines the structure of the proposed sunlight bylaws. 
Sunlight bylaws would accelerate hedge funds’ disclosure obligations 
consistent with the Wachtell Lipton petition. They would also expand 
the scope of disclosure beyond what Section 13(d) and its implementing 
rules require. Critical additional disclosures, spelled out below, include: 
(1) those parties to which the fund has communicated non-public 
information about a prospective strategic proposal and that have agreed 
to trade, traded, or agreed to continue to hold a financial interest in the 
company’s securities; (2) the fund’s ownership interest in the company 
as a percentage of the fund’s overall portfolio; (3) the fund manager’s 
compensation; (4) the fund manager’s investment in the fund; (5) the 
turnover in the fund’s portfolio; and (6) the fund’s prior holding periods 
after any announcements of a financial interest and a strategic 
proposal.13 All requirements would also apply to all wolf pack members, 
even if they do not individually reach the reporting threshold. Such 
disclosures would allow a company’s board and the other stockholders 
to make better and more informed decisions in light of the hedge fund’s 
incentives. 
A sunlight bylaw would also state that unless the activist complies 
with it, the activist’s strategic proposal or nominee for the board cannot 
be considered at a stockholder vote absent board approval. Public 
companies will be able to detect any non-compliance. The lead activist 
must first publicly announce its strategic proposal before a stockholder 
vote to persuade other stockholders to vote for it, which lead activists 
currently do by filing a Schedule 13D under Section 13(d).14  If the 
activist reached the ownership threshold for reporting without disclosing 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Parts I, V.A. 
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under the sunlight bylaw it would be proof positive of a violation. There 
would then be no vote on that proposal or nominee absent board 
approval. Part III also explores how sunlight bylaws would reveal 
critical facts bearing on the hedge funds’ incentives and the possibility 
that they would incent better activism. 
Part IV explains that sunlight bylaws should withstand any facial 
challenge because Delaware law authorizes their passage.15 Delaware 
General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) section 109(b) authorizes them 
because they “relate to” the “rights” and “powers” of stockholders.16 
Consistent with Delaware Supreme Court precedent, they are process-
oriented and agnostic to the substance of any strategic proposal or 
identity of any board nominee. 
Nor could a challenger meet its burden of showing the sunlight 
bylaw would be inequitable in all circumstances. Requiring enhanced 
disclosure is consistent with directors’ fiduciary duties.17 According to 
some recent Delaware court decisions, directors have a fiduciary duty to 
enhance long-term value. 18  Directors certainly must consider the 
implications of strategic proposals for the net present value of the 
company, which requires considering a strategic proposal’s implications 
for more than the hedge funds’ generally short holding periods. In fact, 
Chief Justice Strine has pointed out that enhanced disclosures are important 
to the stockholder’s franchise because the hedge fund’s financial interests 
are critically important to evaluating its proposals.19 That task is made 
much more difficult while the activist hedge funds proposing them 
remain a black box. 
Part V explains that sunlight bylaws would also generally be lawful 
as applied, although much would depend on the particular facts. 20 
Sunlight bylaws enhance the stockholder franchise, promote better 
decision-making by boards, cannot be shown to materially reduce 
beneficial activism, and may incent better activism.21 In addition, the 
burden on the activist and other stockholders is minimal: the disclosures 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See infra Parts IV.A-B. 
 16. See infra Parts IV.A-C. 
 17. See infra Parts IV.D, V.B. 
 18. See infra Parts IV.D, V.B. 
 19. Infra Part V.B.4. 
 20. Infra Part V. 
 21. Infra Parts III.B-C, IV.D, V.B.4. 
486 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
are based on information the activists have readily available; compliance 
permits the activists to avoid any delayed vote on its proposal; and if the 
disclosure is slightly belated or incomplete, the board can demand any 
necessary amendments and exercise its discretion to put the proposal up 
for a stockholder vote. 
To analyze a sunlight bylaw as applied, Part V considers what a 
sunlight bylaw would have revealed and whether it would have been 
upheld in the activist hedge fund Trian’s proxy fight against DuPont’s 
board.22 In that campaign, Trian adopted the common tactic of attacking 
executive compensation relative to performance at DuPont.23 But one 
can compare DuPont’s publicly-reported share price and its then Chair 
and CEO Ellen Kullman’s compensation to what Forbes has reported 
for Trian and its principal, Nelson Peltz. In 2013 and 2014, DuPont 
performed better than Trian, but Kullman averaged about $12.3 million 
in total compensation while Peltz averaged over twenty-four times her 
compensation—$300 million. 24  Back-of-the envelope math based on 
the little publicly-available information suggests that Trian had a 
guaranteed income from management fees of about $226 million in 
2014.25 DuPont’s directors and executive management, the market, and 
other stockholders were entitled to consider more precise and reliable 
disclosures regarding Trian when evaluating whether it better 
represented the interests of other stockholders than DuPont’s directors 
and executive management. 
Part VI explores the idea of, in particular activist campaigns, 
requesting reciprocal disclosures from activists that would reveal much 
of the same information as sunlight bylaws.26 Institutional investors and 
proxy advisory firms have generally embraced the notion that activist 
hedge funds serve as a useful counter-weight to incumbent boards and 
executive management, and many could therefore oppose a proposed 
sunlight bylaw. A board may not believe that its stockholders would 
support a sunlight bylaw or may believe that it would precipitate 
wasteful litigation or a proxy fight. If so, when that board is confronted 
with a strategic proposal by an activist hedge fund, it should informally 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See infra Part IV.B. 
 23. See infra Part IV.B. 
 24. See infra Part IV.B. 
 25. See infra Part IV.B. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
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request that the fund provide the equivalent information in reciprocal 
disclosures and, if requested and lawful, agree to give that information 
confidential treatment for a period of time. 
The directors and executive management should also reserve the 
right to publish the questions that the activist refuses to answer or for 
which it requests confidential treatment. This would provide 
institutional investors and the proxy advisory firms with fodder for 
follow-up questions. Recent research shows that activist hedge funds 
that intervene by taking a larger stake in the company generate higher 
abnormal returns, and perhaps rightly so. But rather than guessing at the 
hedge fund’s stake or incentives based on incomplete public disclosures 
and news reports, the board and institutional stockholders should 
demand that the activist hedge fund disclose the information in a 
succinct, summary form. If the activist hedge fund’s incentives truly are 
better aligned with other stockholders than the directors and executive 
management, it should be happy to oblige. If not, that tells the other 
stockholders something too.27 
I. THE DEBATE OVER ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS 
Both sides of the debate on hedge fund activism agree that it has 
risen sharply, with influence on major companies ranging from Apple to 
Proctor & Gamble to Whole Foods to DuPont.28 Much ink has been 
spilled debating whether hedge fund activism helps or harms other 
stockholders, so only the outlines are sketched here. 
                                                                                                                 
 27. The term “sunlight” comes from Justice Louis Brandeis’ observation that 
“[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. 
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.” LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
92 (1914). Other People’s Money—a screed against the entire banking and investment 
banking industry—influenced many of the securities law reforms of the 1930s. While 
the author does not endorse all of Justice Brandeis’s views, fundamentally, if equity 
markets are to operate in the sunlight, then all of those seeking to change a public 
company’s strategy can reasonably be required to do so. 
 28. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge 
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2015); Martin Lipton, Wachtell, 
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/11/06/d 
ealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-3/ [http://perma.cc/EJ4R-W99Q]. 
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A. INCREASES IN SHARE PRICE SURROUNDING ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS’ 
DISCLOSURES 
Professor Alon Brav and his co-authors published an early study in 
the Journal of Finance showing that activist hedge funds’ securities 
filings under Section 13(d) were surrounded by an abnormal share price 
return of about 7% without reversal during the subsequent year.29 They 
compiled their data from Schedule 13D filings under Section 13(d) and 
internet searches, and cross-checked them against hedge funds’ 
quarterly Schedule 13F filings,30  which do not require disclosure of 
many indirect interests and often receive confidential treatment.31 
Their results, since replicated, showed: 
Graph 1. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return Around the Filing of 
Schedule 13Ds32 
 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund 
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FINANCE 1729 (2008). 
 30. Id. at 1736-38. 
 31. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 864, 871-72 (2006); George 
O. Aragon, Michael Hertzel & Zhen Shi, Why Do Hedge Funds Avoid Disclosure? 
Evidence from Confidential 13F Filings, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, June 2012, 
at 6-7. 
 32. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 29, at 1756. 
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Most of the increase in share price—all but 2%—occurs in the 
period before and on the date of the Schedule 13D filing. Professor Brav 
and his co-authors theorized that the price increase reflected the 
soundness of the strategic proposals based on hedge funds’ superior 
incentives to enhance value because “[h]edge funds employ highly 
incentivized managers,” “can hold highly concentrated positions in 
small numbers of companies,” and “use leverage and derivatives to 
extend their reach.”33 
They also noted a spike in abnormal trading volume before the 
filing.34 They speculated that this might be related to either tipping by 
the filer or coordination among activists acting together, but admitted 
that “[g]iven the informal and secretive nature of such communication, 
our data do[es] not allow for a formal testing of these two 
explanations.”35 They also found that, in the following year, companies 
showed improved return on assets and operating profit margins.36 They 
reported a median holding period of about one year, calculated from the 
filing date of the Schedule 13D to its amendment to reflect that the fund 
no longer held a significant stake.37 
Momentarily lost in the ensuing debate was the disclosure 
asymmetry. On one hand, publicly-traded companies must disclose all 
material information about their assets, share repurchases, dividends, 
executive management’s compensation and interests in the stock, and 
directors’ compensation and interests in the stock. For decades, 
academics have used these detailed and highly regulated disclosures in 
order to craft studies about potential agency issues. In specific 
campaigns, the disclosures can give activists information about facts 
bearing on the incentives of the company’s decision-makers with which 
to attempt to sway the market and other stockholders. 
On the other hand, not all activist hedge funds need even disclose 
their net economic position in the company. Those shy of the Section 
13(d) reporting threshold could take a net short position and 
simultaneously encourage others to vote for a strategic proposal that 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 1730. 
 34. Id. at 1756. 
 35. Id. at 1757. 
 36. Id. at 1770-71. 
 37. Id. at 1731, 1765. 
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they believe will tank the stock a few years after adoption. And activists 
need not disclose the investment as a percentage of their portfolio, or 
disclose any other information about their portfolio turnover, their 
investment horizons, or their decision-makers’ compensation or other 
incentives, although limited information can be gleaned from Section 
13F filings, news reports, and the Internet.38 This distorted disclosure 
landscape means that activist hedge funds and their defenders can 
always articulate some agency issue at least theoretically faced by the 
directors or executive management, but neither the board nor other 
stockholders can evaluate the facts bearing on the activist hedge funds’ 
incentives. On this uneven playing field, activists drive up short-run 
share prices and win stockholder votes. 
And, of course, scholars like Professor Robert Shiller believe that 
short-term stock price movements often reflect speculation, fads, and 
overreactions driven by psychological factors,39 which may cause an 
increase in share price after an activist files a Schedule 13D. In 2014, 
back-of-the-envelope math suggests that the top twenty-five hedge fund 
managers earned over $11 billion collectively, while only half of the top 
ten funds recorded returns that exceeded that of the S&P 500.40 In 2015, 
preliminary reports indicated that the average hedge fund outperformed 
the S&P 500’s decline of 0.75% for the first time in seven years, but the 
average fund only gained 0.03%.41 Reports published in 2016 described 
2015 as “an annus horribilis for many big hedge funds” and cited losses 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Hu & Black, supra note 31, at 864, 871-72. 
 39. ECON. SCI. PRIZE COMM. OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCI., SCIENTIFIC 
BACKGROUND ON THE SVERIGES RIKSBANK PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES IN MEMORY 
OF ALFRED NOBEL 2013: UNDERSTANDING ASSET PRICES 30-35 (2013) [hereinafter 
UNDERSTANDING ASSET PRICES], http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2013/advanced-economicsciences2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/R53S-6K 
KK]. 
 40. Alexandra Stevenson, For Top 25 Hedge Fund Managers, a Difficult 2014 Still 
Paid Well, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/0 
5/business/dealbook/top-25-hedge-fund-managers-took-bad-14-all-the-way-to-the-bank 
.html? ref=dealbook [http://perma.cc/HM67-W8YU]. 
 41. Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Battered, Apologetic and Still 
Pitching Their Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nyti 
mes.com/2015/12/16/business/dealbook/battered-apologetic-and-still-pitching-their-hed 
ge-funds.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/5Q3D-GY4L]. 
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from large funds ranging from about 5% to 20%.42 Perhaps hedge funds 
have built an undeserved reputation for financial acumen; indeed, it 
appears that investors poured more than $18 billion into hedge funds in 
2014 despite high fees and a poor average performance.43 That could 
also drive the short-term increase in share price. 
B. THE DEBATE OVER SHORT-TERMISM 
Activist hedge funds’ interventions and early empirical work 
quickly elicited a short-termism argument from those with more 
practical experience. 44  The short-termism criticism ran: (1) activist 
investors have short investment horizons;45  (2) activist hedge funds’ 
“real goal is a short-term bump in the stock price,” because “[t]hey 
lobby publicly for significant structural changes, hoping to drive up the 
share price and book quick profits,” and “[t]hen they bail out, leaving 
corporate management to clean up the mess;”46 and (3) activist hedge 
funds often push for cuts in long-term “research and development 
expenses, capital expenditures, market development, and new business 
ventures, simply because they promise to pay off only in the long-term” 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Activist Investors May Have Met Their Match: A 
Down Market, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
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of the Adverse Effects of Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
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D. Fink, Chairman and CEO, Blackrock, to Shareholders (Mar. 31, 2015), 
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-041415.pdf [http://perma.cc/MFH8-6D9D]. 
 45. Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 28, at 1093-94. 
 46. Id. at 1094 (quoting Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, Not Long-
Term Value, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:56 AM), http://dealbook.nytim 
es.com/2013/08/26/activists-seek-short-term-gain-not-long-term-value/?_r=0 [http://per 
ma.cc/9ZZ4-Z4N3]). 
492 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
for mergers, spin-offs, share repurchases, or dividends that increase 
share prices in the short-term.47 
In industries that require making enormous capital outlays based on 
confidential information about the potential yield of research and 
development programs, like pharmaceuticals, the directors and 
executive management must decide issues with impacts that can span 
decades. Professor Lucian Bebchuk and one of his co-authors have 
acknowledged the market’s focus on short-term returns can mean that 
“[u]nderinvestment will occur when the market has incomplete 
information about the level of investment undertaken,” as is the case for 
“investments which must be kept secret from competitors such as new 
product designs and developments.” 48  Making such long-term 
investments may also create enormous social value. Cutting those 
outlays and foregoing their long-term value to increase earnings, pay a 
portion in dividends, or spin-off a portion of the company may bump up 
stock price or operating performance for as long as five years, while 
harming the company’s stockholders and society over a twenty-year 
period.49 
Professor Bebchuk responded by explaining why activists may 
sometimes promote long-term value. Professor Bebchuk theorized that 
the premises of those critical of short-termism do not rule out activists 
seeking actions that increase long-term value. Activists would have 
incentives to do so “when the action’s effect on short-term value is 
expected to at least partly reflect its positive effect on long-term value,” 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. (quoting Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of 
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and “it is plausible for short-term and long-term changes in value to be 
at least positively correlated.”50 
Revisiting the finance research on the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis yields an additional important insight: hedge funds have no 
unique ability to understand the market as a class of investors. Since 
Professor Eugene Fama published his seminal paper on the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis in 1970, “[a] remarkably large body of 
evidence suggests that professional investment managers are not able to 
outperform index funds that buy and hold the broad stock market 
portfolio.”51 Indeed, Warren Buffett is handily winning his bet with a 
New York hedge fund manager that the hedge fund would underperform 
Buffett’s investment in an S&P index fund over a ten-year period: by 
early 2014, the hedge fund had underperformed by about 30%.52 
Professor Bebchuk has argued that opponents of activism assume 
market inefficiencies because they also assume that short-term share 
price increases do not reflect long-term consequences,53 but his theory is 
incompatible with an efficient market that rapidly incorporates all 
publicly-available information. He argues that activist hedge funds 
target underperforming and presumably undervalued companies and 
know why they are undervalued.54 But the activist hedge funds’ ability, 
as a class of investors, to target those firms is called into doubt by the 
general tenets of the efficient capital markets hypothesis and the 
reporting on the returns of hedge funds. Hedge funds cannot identify 
undervalued companies with recently enacted business and governance 
changes that are likely to perform better than the market generally, so it 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term 
Shareholder Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1663 (2013). 
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PERSP. 59, 77 (2003). 
 52. See Mitch Tuchum, Warren Buffet on Track to Win Hedge Fund Bet, 
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seems unlikely that they can identify undervalued firms to determine 
which are ripe for intervention. On top of that, they then must succeed at 
the complex task of picking the right business and governance changes 
out of a large range of possibilities to boost long-term operating 
performance and share price. A strong version of the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis casts doubt on their unique ability to do this. 
And notable critics of strong versions of the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis would not assume that activist hedge funds can 
accurately predict returns based on particular business or governance 
changes with an investment horizon of one or two years. Over the last 
four decades, “systematic evidence” has developed “that returns on 
exchange-traded stocks are somewhat predictable over short horizons, 
but that the degree of predictability is so low that hardly any unexploited 
trading profits remain, once transaction costs are taken into account.”55 
Only over the longer term do investors like Buffett or scholars like 
Professor Shiller, who criticize the limits of the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis, think it possible to reliably identify undervalued companies 
and profit from their return to a valuation that more accurately reflects 
the business’s prospects. The most prominent detractors of the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis like Professor Shiller claim that metrics such 
as book-to-market value can predict stock prices over the course of 
business cycles.56 
As Professor Shiller put it colloquially in a New York Times 
opinion piece: the efficient capital markets hypothesis is a “half-truth.”57 
Professor Shiller explains: 
If the theory said nothing more than that it is unlikely that the 
average amateur investor can get rich quickly by trading in the 
markets based on publicly available information, the theory would 
be spot on. I personally believe this, and in my own investing I have 
avoided trading too much.58 
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Hardly an amateur, Professor Shiller apparently would not turn 
over his portfolio at the up to 300% rate that hedge funds do each year.59 
Such a churn is highly unlikely to yield profits in the long term and 
makes suspect the claim that such activist hedge funds systematically 
and correctly identify targets for intervention to improve long-term 
value. 
Professors John Coffee and Darius Palia seem to embrace the idea 
that activist investing is a way for hedge funds to circumvent the limited 
profitability created by efficient equity markets, but they fail to explain 
why an activist investor would not first have to pick stocks and make 
judgments equally or more difficult than those required in the market to 
identify an underperforming target and make strategic proposals to 
remedy its underperformance.60 In that same paper, they also conclude 
that when looking at three- and five-calendar year returns before and 
after the filing of a Schedule 13D, studies find that stock returns are not 
statistically significant from zero, using a four-factor model to predict 
alternative returns on equity investments elsewhere in the market.61 In 
other words, activist interventions do not enable the targeted firms to 
beat the market. 
Bereft of evidence that hedge funds are better at stock picking, 
Professor Bebchuk returned to where Professor Brav began—he relied 
on agency arguments to cast the average activist hedge fund manager in 
the role of Robin Hood.62 He assumed that hedge fund managers with 
access to only publicly-available information and with compensation 
that depends on the performance of the fund’s fractional interest in one 
of many investments will systematically push for business and 
governance decisions that create positive externalities for other investors 
after the hedge funds have reaped their profits and exited. He also 
assumed that the hedge funds are systematically better positioned and 
incentivized to make those decisions than the company’s directors and 
executive management, despite the latter’s access to proprietary 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction 
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 61. Id. at 69. 
 62. Bebchuk, supra note 50, at 1663-64. 
496 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
information, compensation, and continued employment linked directly 
to the performance of that company.63 
Fast forward to the present, and now there seems to be agreement 
on each side about five general empirical features of hedge fund 
activism: (1) the number of activist hedge fund challenges to public 
companies has skyrocketed; (2) there is a short-term spike in target 
companies’ stock prices surrounding an activist hedge fund’s Schedule 
13D filing; (3) an activist hedge fund that acquires shares prior to hitting 
the reporting threshold under the securities laws for filing a Schedule 
13D stands to gain an immediate profit once the Schedule 13D is filed; 
(4) activist hedge funds usually exit within one or two years after the 
filing of the Schedule 13D; 64  and (5) hedge funds turn over their 
portfolios at around 100% to 300% each year.65 
Empirical studies have also focused on the correlation between 
activist interventions and agency costs. Professors Coffee and Palia 
survey studies of the effect of activist interventions to change corporate 
governance and executive compensation and conclude that “most of the 
evidence shows that the positive abnormal returns are not statistically 
significantly related to” changes in corporate governance or reduction of 
excessive managerial compensation.66 
Empirical studies have also recently focused on the correlation 
between activist interventions and long-term value. Professor Bebchuk, 
his co-authors, and others have attempted to support their claims about 
activists through empirical studies that lump all activists together, but 
any overall increase in long-term stockholder value that follows activist 
interventions ranges from nonexistent to tiny. Professors Coffee and Palia 
explain that studies have found that it is “unclear that there is any 
significant positive long term-price reaction” absent a proposed take-over 
or restructuring and it is “doubtful that operating performance improves 
after activist interventions.”67 Professor Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin 
have pointed out that Professor Bebchuk and his co-authors’ industry-
                                                                                                                 
 63. Compare id. (arguing that activists can indeed produce long-term benefits), with 
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 64. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 36, 80. 
 65. Strine, supra note 59, at 478 n.87. 
 66. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 75-76. 
 67. Id. at 80. 
2016]                              TWO NEW TOOLS FOR                               497 
ADDRESSING ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS 
specific tables in their latest study measuring return on assets show “a 
performance infinitesimally smaller than industry performance [in year 
one] to a performance infinitesimally better than industry performance” in 
year five. 68  Indeed, Professor Bebchuk and his co-authors themselves 
describe their study as principally proving a negative; namely, that activist 
interventions are not followed by declines on operating performance or 
stock price in the ensuing five years.69 These studies reveal that activist 
interventions are sometimes followed by positive results and sometimes by 
negative results. 
Professor Martijin Cremers and his co-authors published a paper 
reporting the results of a study that attempts to control for the selection 
bias created by hedge funds’ typical tactic of targeting underperforming 
companies. 70  They created a matched sample where for each firm 
targeted by a hedge fund they assigned a control non-targeted firm with 
similar characteristics. They found that hedge fund activist interventions 
reduce long-term value at targeted firms over three years by about 9.8% 
compared to their control sample of matched underperforming firms.71 
And they found that innovative firms decline in value by about 50% 
after being targeted. 72  They are currently dueling with defenders of 
hedge fund activism over the data.73 
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Professor Allaire and Dauphin have reported the results from a 
study that tries to catalogue the different hedge fund interventions.74 
They surveyed nine studies on activist campaigns and noted that their 
data sets included widely divergent numbers of campaigns.75 They then 
drilled down into the data captured by the Wall Street Journal-FactSet 
Activism Scorecard to categorize activist campaigns.76 Their findings 
show that hedge funds adopt the tactic of publicly criticizing the 
company in about 28% of cases with about a 59% success rate.77 Their 
findings also show that activist hedge fund interventions are followed by 
slashing research and development until the third year after the 
intervention, by which time most activists have liquidated their 
investments, while the median research and development for a random 
sample of firms increased substantially. 78  They found slight 
improvements on return on assets, but most of those improvements were 
driven by financial engineering in the form of selling assets, 
repurchasing shares, or cutting investments. 79  They also found that, 
although stock price tends to increase slightly compared to a random 
sample, in many cases it is driven by the sale of targeted firms, spin offs, 
or stock repurchases.80 
Professors Coffee and Palia explain: “[B]ecause management 
generally has better information than outsiders, coupled with a strong 
incentive to maximize the firm’s stock price, one can no longer begin 
from the premise that investment projects favored by management are 
the product of an inefficient preference for ‘empire-building.’”81 
Finally, Professors C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy, and Randall 
Thomas published a paper reporting that the abnormal returns for hedge 
funds that make the largest investments are correlated with higher initial 
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abnormal stock price returns, higher returns on assets, and higher 
research and development spending.82 
C. THE RISE OF WOLF PACKS 
Recently, activist hedge funds have coordinated and acted as “wolf 
packs” agitating for corporate changes collectively, but in a way that 
does not require classifying them as a “group” for reporting under 
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act.83 These non-groups often buy on the 
knowledge, shared among them, that at least one will shortly file a 
Schedule 13D that discloses a strategic plan for a potential sale or break-
up of the company.84 After all, sales of public companies are usually 
accompanied by control premiums, and some finance theory predicts, all 
else being equal, that conglomerates in the aggregate trade at a discount 
to the sum of the value of their pure play segments. And companies have 
often responded to activists’ threats of proxy contests with share 
repurchases and dividends.85 
Wolf packs raise unique agency and disclosure issues. Because 
each member owns a smaller interest individually, the inference that it is 
more likely to promote the interests of long-term stockholders than the 
company’s executive management and directors seems particularly 
strained. 
Wolf packs are also more opaque because they can collectively 
own more shares before triggering the reporting requirements under 
Section 13(d). They also effectively evade the federal securities laws’ 
requirement that a beneficial owner of above 10% of a company’s stock 
automatically forfeit any short-swing profits if it sells within six 
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months. 86  Therefore, it is probably no coincidence that studies of 
Schedule 13D filings show that individual activists’ average ownership 
is about 8.3% and wolf packs’ average, collective ownership is about 
13.44%. 87  Of course, that latter number may well be a substantial 
underestimate because it is unclear that all members of any wolf pack 
meet Section 13(d)’s requirements: at least sometimes additional 
members likely lurk below its reporting threshold, undisclosed and 
uncounted.88  Members could even take turns in campaigns, at times 
serving as a lead agitator and at other times simply as an opportunistic 
buyer and seller that could buy shortly before and sell shortly after the 
filing of the Schedule 13D for a guaranteed profit. Naturally, this 
opacity complicates efforts to study and understand wolf pack behavior. 
Some academics have also raised concerns about the undisclosed 
decoupling of share ownership from voting rights, which is particularly 
acute for wolf pack members.89 Professors Henry Hu and Bernard Black 
have explained that by buying shares while simultaneously taking short 
positions through swaps and other derivatives, investors can engage in 
“empty voting”: the investor can structure its economic interest so that it 
holds more votes than shares and may even have an undisclosed net 
short position.90 This would “give[] the investor an incentive to vote in 
ways that reduce the company’s share price.”91 Given that these shorts 
are not disclosed by wolf pack members that never reach the threshold at 
which they may have to disclose that information on a Schedule 13D 
filing, there is no way to know the extent of this problem.92 
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II. ENHANCING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 13(D) 
The limits of the current knowledge about activist hedge funds, 
their collective net economic interests, and their activities below current 
reporting thresholds have constrained companies’ ability to evaluate 
activist proposals and academics’ ability to research the issue. 
In 2011, as a partial remedy, Wachtell Lipton petitioned the SEC to 
enact revised rules under Section 13(d) that would require stockholders 
to file a Schedule 13D disclosure within one business day rather than ten 
after passing the 5% ownership threshold. 93  This would effectively 
lower the reporting threshold by counting derivatives and short interests 
toward it. 94  Professors Coffee and Palia have suggested that the 
proposed rules could be further revised to make any activist that traded 
on a shared strategy part of the group.95 
Professor Bebchuk and one of his co-authors responded to the 
Wachtell Lipton petition with many of the same claims about the value 
of activist hedge funds but extended his argument even further. He 
added the claim that enhancing disclosure requirements would be so 
burdensome that it would deter a material amount of beneficial 
activism. 96  In response to the hedge fund’s disclosure, the target 
company can enact a rights plan that effectively caps the activist’s 
investment. 97  And, regardless of whether a rights plan is enacted, 
Professor Bebchuk theorized that the marginal profits hedge funds make 
buying an increased stake at a level higher than an amended reporting 
threshold but lower than the current reporting threshold are necessary to 
incentivize them to benefit long-term stockholders.98 But concerns about 
the theoretical possibility that moderate limits on the profitability of 
hedge funds’ investments will disincentivize beneficial activism ignore 
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the massive surge in activism recognized by all. There hardly seems to 
be a shortage of incentives to engage in it. 
Professors Coffee and Palia have identified eight separate legal and 
financial changes that have increased activism by hedge funds, 
including: (1) the decline of staggered boards so all directors stand for 
election at the same time and are more vulnerable to proxy contests; (2) 
the rise of proxy advisors due in part to the need for low-cost pensions 
and mutual funds to cheaply meet relatively new regulatory standards of 
care for voting their shares; and (3) the prohibition against brokers, 
which used to routinely vote with management on strategic proposals, 
voting shares held in street name for their clients without instructions.99 
None of these three changes would be affected by enhanced disclosure 
requirements imposed on hedge funds. Because of these many complex 
variables contributing to the rise in activism, Professor Bebchuk has 
failed to articulate why the reduction in profit-taking caused by 
enhanced disclosure would deter a meaningful level of beneficial 
activism. 
Recent evidence of activism across twenty-three countries also may 
show that its level is relatively insensitive to differences in disclosure 
and corporate governance regimes. As Wachtell Lipton noted in its 
petition, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Hong Kong require 
disclosure more quickly after reaching ownership thresholds than the 
United States.100 Professor Marco Becht and his co-authors, however, 
have recently reported that activism is also frequent in Europe and Asia, 
that it generates short-term abnormal returns comparable to the United 
States, and that activists appear to adapt tactics to each country’s 
corporate governance and disclosure regime.101 This naturally leads to 
the question of what disclosure and governance regime best promotes 
beneficial activism, even if it might be one that reduces the overall level 
of activism. 
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III. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS WOULD REVEAL NECESSARY INFORMATION 
Public companies can pass sunlight bylaws to require what the 
outdated rules under Section 13(d) fail to mandate. Those bylaws would 
also require activist hedge funds to provide specific facts bearing on the 
general claims made by their defenders. 
A. OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSED SUNLIGHT BYLAWS 
Borrowing heavily from the Wachtell Lipton petition and 
Professors Coffee and Palia’s paper, the bylaws would require: 
 
(1) the stockholder to post on the internet an affidavit from its 
highest-ranking financial officer within one business day after acquiring 
a financial interest above 5% of the outstanding shares of the company 
on behalf of itself and those with which it is coordinating for any of the 
purposes listed in Item 4 of the regulations governing Schedule 13D 
disclosures;102 
(2) the term “financial interest” would encompass ownership of any 
financial instrument that creates the opportunity, directly or indirectly, 
to profit or share in any profit derived from any increase or decrease in 
the value of the company’s securities; 
(3) the affidavit must separately disclose any indirect interests held 
by the stockholder in the company, including short interests, derivatives, 
or swap positions; 
(4) those parties with which the stockholder is coordinating would 
include those that the stockholder shares non-public information about a 
prospective strategic proposal, an affidavit to be published as required 
by the sunlight bylaw, a Schedule 13D filing, or a proxy campaign and 
that have agreed to trade, traded, or agreed to continue to hold a 
financial interest in the company’s securities; 
                                                                                                                 
 102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2015). This threshold could be adjusted depending 
on the market capitalization of the company, and, in fact, might be far too low for a 
company like DuPont with a market capitalization of about $68 billion during Trian’s 
activist campaign. By the date that Trian filed its definitive proxy there, it owned about 
24.5 million shares, only about 2.7% of those outstanding. The Trian Group, Proxy 
Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 25, 2015). 
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(5) the affidavit must disclose those parties outside the 
stockholding institution to which the stockholder has communicated 
non-public information about a prospective strategic proposal, an 
affidavit to be published as required by the sunlight bylaw, a Schedule 
13D filing, or a proxy campaign; 
(6) those parties with which the stockholder is coordinating would 
have to separately disclose, consistent with the bylaw’s requirements, 
within one business day after receiving the shared, non-public 
information and agreeing to trade, trading, or agreeing to continue to 
hold even if they individually did not pass the 5% threshold; 
(7) the affidavit must disclose the stockholder’s investment in the 
target company as a percentage of the stockholder’s total investments; 
(8) the affidavit must disclose any compensation scheme, any total 
actual compensation, actual compensation based on the percentage of 
assets under management, actual compensation based on any 
performance fee for realized gains, actual compensation based on any 
performance fee for unrealized gains, and any investment in or options 
for investment in the stockholder for the current year and each of the 
past five years for those making decisions about the stockholder’s 
investment in the company or any strategic proposals for the company; 
(9) the affidavit must separately disclose the stockholder’s return 
on investment quarterly for the past five years for all investments, all 
publicly-traded equity investments, all investments that the stockholder 
has held for at least three years, and all publicly-traded equity 
investments that the stockholder has held for at least three years; 
(10) the affidavit must disclose the stockholder’s annual portfolio 
turnover for each of the past five years for publicly-traded equity 
investments and all investments; 
(11) the affidavit must disclose the stockholder’s prior Schedule 
13D filings or disclosures under sunlight bylaws, any subsequent 
material purchases or sales, when it amended its Schedule 13D or 
disclosures under the sunlight bylaw to reflect those, and the total length 
after filing it held a material number of shares in those companies; 
(12) the affidavit must disclose all of the other information required 
in a Schedule 13D filing; 
(13) the stockholder must email a copy of the affidavit and an 
internet link to it to a designated company email address; 
(14) if there are any material changes to any of the information 
disclosed in the affidavit, the stockholder must amend the filing one 
business day after the change, following the same procedures; 
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(15) if a stockholder violates the sunlight bylaw, it would foreclose 
the business or nominee supported by the activist from being considered 
at a stockholder vote absent board approval; and 
(16) any stockholder required to make and that made Section 13G 
filings for the prior three calendar years would be exempt from the 
requirements of the sunlight bylaw. 
 
More detailed work is necessary to spell out the precise language of 
sunlight bylaws, but this Article will assume the above framework to 
evaluate their validity and enforceability. 
B. SUNLIGHT BYLAW DISCLOSURES WOULD ANSWER KEY QUESTIONS 
ABOUT ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS 
Besides having all the benefits that Wachtell Lipton’s petition for 
rule-making would bring, sunlight bylaws have some unique, additional 
advantages. They can answer, in the context that matters most, many of 
the factual disputes between activist hedge funds’ proponents and 
detractors. 
Under any view of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, it is 
difficult to understand why activist hedge funds can so improve business 
or governance based on publicly-available information. The proponents 
of activist hedge funds believe them to be better agents for other 
stockholders than the directors and executive management. But rather 
than simply continuing to assume, theorize, or study that generalization 
based on spotty data, the activist hedge funds should have to disclose the 
specific information bearing on it. 
As explained, Professors Brav’s and Bebchuk’s theoretical defense 
of activism claims it is only beneficial at times, and, at bottom, rests 
entirely on the notion that activists are better incentivized than the 
company’s executive management and directors.103 And the subsequent 
empirical work by defenders of activism shows that lumping activist 
hedge funds and their campaigns together reveals mixed results.104 Their 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See supra Part I.A-B. 
 104. See supra Part I.B. 
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work therefore demonstrates that activist hedge funds sometimes harm 
net present value and long-term value.105 
To be more concrete: Professor Bebchuk has argued that detractors 
of activist hedge funds assume their investment horizons are shorter than 
they really are.106 But a sunlight bylaw would require each activist hedge 
fund to disclose its portfolio turnover and prior holding periods after 
publicly announcing its financial interests and strategic proposal. That 
tells everyone, directly, the fund’s general approach to holding assets, its 
general investment horizon, and when, in the past, it has decided that the 
value of its investment has peaked. 
Professor Brav and his co-authors have argued that because hedge 
funds invest in fewer companies, hedge funds invest more money in 
each, and because hedge fund managers take a larger percentage of the 
profits, they have stronger incentives to research, monitor, invest, and 
intervene.107 Again, rather than theorizing about this possibility, sunlight 
bylaws would require disclosure of the activist hedge fund’s direct and 
indirect investment in the company as a percentage of its portfolio and 
the compensation of the hedge fund’s decision-makers. That would 
allow stockholders to compare the incentives of the company’s decision-
makers to those at the activist hedge fund, which is the relevant 
comparative agency issue. 
C. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS COULD IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF ACTIVIST 
PROPOSALS 
Sunlight bylaws might also encourage activists to better align their 
incentives with other stockholders. 
If activist wolf pack members engage in empty voting, by buying 
shares and the accompanying voting rights while taking a smaller or 
short net economic position, sunlight bylaws would expose that. 
Professor Thomas Briggs recognized long before wolf pack activism 
reached its current heights, that “[h]edge funds know as well as anyone 
else that sunlight is the best disinfectant” and “a competently advised 
hedge fund that is truly bent on behavior that might not do well in the 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See supra Part I.B. 
 106. Bebchuk, supra note 50, at 1660-61. 
 107. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 29, at 2, 7. 
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sun is simply not going to purchase enough shares to require a Schedule 
13D filing.”108 
Forcing comprehensive and systematic disclosure of short 
positions, including those taken through swaps and derivatives, would 
require wolf pack members lurking below current disclosure thresholds 
to evaluate carefully how that disclosure would affect any lead activist’s 
ability to sway the institutional stockholders that control the bulk of the 
voting power. This type of disclosure might also encourage wolf pack 
members to take long positions and think twice before joining a 
meritless campaign simply to cash in on the short-term increase in stock 
price that surrounds the filing of a Schedule 13D. “[F]or the institutional 
shareholders who ultimately decide whether to support an activist’s 
proposal, the fact that the activist takes a greater economic stake based 
solely on the performance of the stock is a credible signal of a high-
quality proposal . . . .”109 
Activist hedge funds and wolf pack members, which are 
sophisticated, savvy, and experienced institutions, would well 
understand these dynamics ex ante. 110  Forcing disclosure of these 
derivative and potentially short positions might dissuade them from ever 
launching campaigns where many members have a close-to-zero or net 
short economic interest in the company’s share price. Thus, sunlight 
bylaws, even if they reduce the total amount of activism, might increase 
the quality of activist proposals. 
IV. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS ARE FACIALLY VALID 
Activists would likely sue soon after the enactment of a sunlight 
bylaw to challenge its facial validity. When companies, including 
Federal Express and Chevron, passed forum selection bylaws, a dozen 
lawsuits challenging their facial validity were filed in Delaware. 111 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: 
An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 703-04 (2007). 
 109. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 863, 913 (2013). 
 110. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 28-32 (describing wolf packs generally). 
 111. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 938 (Del. 
Ch. 2013). 
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Activist hedge funds are not bashful, and at least one could sue 
immediately after a public company passed a sunlight bylaw. 
A. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING FACIAL VALIDITY 
A corporation’s bylaws are “presumed to be valid, and the courts 
will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the law rather than 
strike down the bylaws.”112 “In an unbroken line of decisions dating 
back several generations,” the Delaware “Supreme Court has made clear 
that the bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a 
Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”113 
Delaware courts have upheld bylaws of Delaware corporations that 
require stockholders to vote at a later date,114 sue in specified forums,115 
and pay attorneys’ fees if they lose litigation.116 Although recent changes 
to the DGCL limit forum selection bylaws and eliminate fee-shifting 
bylaws, the cross-section of Delaware lawyers representing the major 
constituencies recommending the change recognized that “[t]he DGCL 
is broadly enabling and gives wide authority to boards—and 
stockholders—to adopt binding bylaw and charter provisions.”117 
To be facially valid, a bylaw must be authorized by the DGCL, 
must be consistent with the certificate of incorporation, and must not be 
otherwise unlawful.118 A party mounting a facial challenge to a bylaw 
“must show that the bylaws cannot operate lawfully or equitably under 
any circumstances” and “can never operate consistently with the law.”119 
                                                                                                                 
 112. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014) 
(citation and internal quotation omitted). 
 113. Chevron, 73 A.3d at 955. 
 114. Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 495-97 (Del. Ch. 1995), aff’d and 
remanded, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995). 
 115. Chevron, 73 A.3d at 939. 
 116. ATP, 91 A.3d at 558. 
 117. Francis Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection 
Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COMMERCIAL LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.delaw 
arelitigation.com/2015/03/articles/commentary/delaware-proposes-new-fee-shifting-and 
-forum-selection-legislation/ [http://perma.cc/MZU9-KP3G]. 
 118. ATP, 91 A.3d at 557-58. 
 119. Chevron, 73 A.3d at 948. 
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B. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS ARE AUTHORIZED BY DGCL SECTION 109(B) 
1. The Text Authorizes Sunlight Bylaws 
DGCL section 109(b)’s plain meaning is dispositive.120 The statute 
enables a company to pass otherwise lawful bylaws “relating to . . . the 
rights or powers of its stockholders.”121 
Dictionaries define “powers” to include any “ability to act or 
produce an effect” and “legal authority.” 122  Sunlight bylaws, by 
requiring activist hedge funds to make disclosures not required by 
current law for their proposals to be considered, limit their “ability to 
act,” ability to effect stockholder approval, and authority to put business 
to a stockholder vote. Sunlight bylaws thus “relat[e] to” stockholders’ 
“powers.” 
Dictionaries define “rights” to include any “power” or “privilege” 
that is “secured to a person by law.”123 Sunlight bylaws delimit the legal 
privileges afforded to activist hedge funds to put business to a 
stockholder vote without making disclosures and therefore “relat[e] to” 
their rights. 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Angstadt v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 4 A.3d 382, 388, 388 n.5, 390 (Del. 
2010). 
 121. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015). 
 122. Power, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/power [http://perma.cc/J9H5-8PXY]; see 
also Power, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/1491 
67?rskey=oXGRuw&result=1#eid [http://perma.cc/3PM3-NJJR]; Power, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968); 8 THE 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 669 (Oxford University Press 1961) (1884-1928). 
 123. Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Right, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/right [http://perma.cc/AX2L-TTZ4]; Right, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/165853?rskey=96JvHS&result=1&isAdvanced=false#
eid [http://perma.cc/U87V-GSZE]; Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968); 7 
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1218 (Oxford University Press 1961) (1884-1928). 
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2. Sunlight Bylaws Are Process-Oriented 
Sunlight bylaws are also authorized by Delaware law because they 
set forth rules and procedures that bind a corporation and its 
stockholders and dictate no particular outcome. 
In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the Delaware 
Supreme Court found that a stockholder-proposed bylaw that would 
have required reimbursement for dissident stockholder proxy contest 
expenses was authorized by section 109(b).124 The company opposing 
the proposed bylaw did not even argue that section 109(b)’s broad 
language did not authorize it, but instead argued that it contradicted 
another provision of the DGCL not relevant here. 125  The court 
nonetheless relied on the breadth of authority granted under 
section 109(b) and the DGCL more generally to dispose of the 
argument. The court explained that “[b]ylaws, by their very nature, set 
down rules and procedures that bind a corporation’s board and its 
shareholders.” 126  The court noted that “procedural, process-oriented” 
bylaws such as those regulating proxy contests are firmly ensconced in 
Delaware law, and therefore found that the DGCL authorized the 
proposed bylaw. 127  And, although Delaware courts rarely consider 
hypotheticals when confronted with facial challenge to bylaws, the 
Delaware Supreme Court, in the unique procedural posture of answering 
a certified question from the SEC, 128  found the bylaw inequitable 
because reimbursement could sometimes violate the incumbent 
directors’ fiduciary duties.129 
Sunlight bylaws would not be the first time that companies have 
followed up on the SEC’s failure to pass effective rules by modifying 
and adopting them as bylaws. Mary Schapiro was the SEC Chair when it 
issued the shareholder proxy access rule permitting holders of 3% or 
more of shares for the past three years to add director nominees to the 
company’s proxy, which was vacated by the D.C. Circuit. But she now 
sits on the board of General Electric, which has passed a bylaw similar 
                                                                                                                 
 124. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) 
 125. Id. at 233-34. 
 126. Id. at 234. 
 127. Id. at 235-36. 
 128. Chevron, 73 A.3d at 949 n.62. 
 129. AFSCME Emps., 953 A.2d at 240. 
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to that invalidated rule.130 And General Electric’s bylaws also provide 
that non-compliance with the procedural requirements for gaining access 
to General Electric’s proxy forecloses the business proposed by the 
stockholder from being conducted at the stockholder meeting.131 
Although sunlight bylaws regulate stockholders at a different stage 
of the process, they are procedural, process-oriented bylaws. As part of 
the process of acquiring a significant ownership stake in a company and 
making a strategic proposal, raising business that could be the subject of 
a proxy vote, or seeking to elect a director, stockholders must make 
additional disclosures. 
C. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF DGCL 
SECTION 202 
Activists might argue that the sunlight bylaws fall within the scope 
of DGCL section 202 and therefore cannot bind non-consenting 
stockholders, but they do not. Section 202 governs “restrictions on the 
transfer or registration of transfer of a security of a corporation, or on 
the amount of the corporation’s securities that may be owned by any 
person or group of persons.” 132  But sunlight bylaws do not restrict 
transferability or limit ownership: the activist hedge fund can still buy 
and sell as many shares as it likes. Sunlight bylaws are therefore quite 
different from the examples of restrictions listed in the statute, such as 
those that give the company the right of first refusal, obligate the 
company to purchase the securities under certain conditions, require the 
company’s consent to a sell, obligate the holder to sell to someone else, 
or prohibit or restrict the transfer of shares to designated persons.133 
Thus, section 202 does not bar sunlight bylaws. 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Ted Mann & Joann S. Lublin, GE to Allow Proxy Access for Big Investors, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-amends-bylaws-
to-allow-proxy-access-for-big-investors-1423698010 [http://perma.cc/NYH4-4VQR]. 
 131. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., BYLAWS 5 art. VII.D (2016). 
 132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (2015). 
 133. Id. § 202(c). 
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D. A CHALLENGER COULD NOT SHOW SUNLIGHT BYLAWS WOULD 
NEVER OPERATE LAWFULLY 
In a facial challenge, an activist could not meet its burden of 
showing that sunlight bylaws cannot operate lawfully or equitably under 
any circumstance. As explained, sunlight bylaws would enhance the 
stockholder franchise, would promote better board decision-making, 
cannot be shown to materially reduce beneficial activism, and may 
promote better activism. 
And sunlight bylaws would not necessarily make an incumbent 
board’s view of the proper strategy for the company more persuasive, let 
alone entrench the board. If a hedge fund with an investment strategy 
akin to Berkshire Hathaway’s, with what Buffett has described as its 
preferred holding period of “forever,” publishes an affidavit disclosing 
its portfolio turnover and prior holding periods, it could make a long-
term stockholder more likely to support the hedge fund. If the hedge 
fund manager’s large and long-standing ownership stake in the fund 
creates an overall incentive structure that skews toward rewarding long-
term performance while the company’s management is heavily 
compensated based on salary, it may also be a selling point for the hedge 
fund. And, finally, if a fellow stockholder is looking for a short-term 
gain, then it may prefer the proposal of a hedge fund with a high 
portfolio turnover. 
V. A SUNLIGHT BYLAW AND A HYPOTHETICAL AS-APPLIED 
CHALLENGE 
Legal challenges to sunlight bylaws could also arise in an activist’s 
push for a strategic proposal that escalates into litigation between the 
activist and the company. Although every case must be judged 
individually, sunlight bylaws should pass muster if thoughtfully adopted 
and administered. 
A. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DUPONT 
Consider the following facts from the activist hedge fund Trian’s 
two-year campaign against DuPont that culminated in a proxy fight. In 
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June 2013, Trian contacted DuPont and made strategic proposals, 
including breaking up the company into four different segments and 
reducing research and development spending.134 On August 14, 2013, 
Trian filed a Schedule 13F disclosing beneficial ownership of over 5 
million shares or about 0.65% of DuPont’s stock. 135  Over years of 
engagement, DuPont spun off a chemicals segment, reduced research 
and development spending by about $9 billion, and bought back about 
$2 billion in shares, but rejected the more radical break-up.136 In the Fall 
of 2014, the negotiations broke down and Trian’s principal Nelson Peltz 
demanded that, absent the appointment of Trian nominees to the board 
of directors, Trian would launch a proxy fight.137 DuPont refused, and 
the fight ensued.138 
DuPont defeated the insurgent slate of directors, largely because it 
successfully appealed to three index funds—Vanguard Group, 
Blackrock Inc., and State Street Corp.—and retail investors.139 DuPont 
prevailed despite the recommendations from the two leading proxy 
advisors, Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. and Glass Lewis & Co, 
in favor of voting in Peltz as a director.140 
But the two-year battle was enormously costly, forced the DuPont 
board to make moves to increase short-term value such as the spin-off 
and a substantial stock buy-back, and whipsawed the market price of a 
$68 billion company.141 Indeed, Professors Coffee and Palia conclude 
                                                                                                                 
 134. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 23, 
2015). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Jacob Bunge & David Benoit, DuPont Defeats Peltz, Trian in Board Fight, 
WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-appears-poised-to-
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 140. Id. 
 141. Jacob Bunge & David Benoit, DuPont Repels Push by Peltz to Join its Board, 
WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2015, 8:23 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-repels-push 
-by-peltz-to-join-its-board-1431562720 [http://perma.cc/8SDW-P7JK]; Bill George, 
Peltz’s Attack on DuPont Threatens American’s Research Edge, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/business/dealbook/pelt 
zs-attacks-on-dupont-threaten-americas-research-edge.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/FM8 
A-LJHE]. 
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that “DuPont survived largely intact by preempting Trian’s strategy—
with the result that, whether management wins or loses in the proxy 
contest, [research & development] expenditures decline.”142 And Peltz 
still lost by only about 8% of the shares voted.143 Since DuPont “won” 
that proxy fight, its CEO has resigned “and the new CEO announced 
that the company would pursue some of the strategies Trian [] had urged 
in the proxy fight.”144 And now, under continuing pressure, DuPont has 
proposed a complicated merger with Dow Chemical that will result in a 
combined company with over 100,000 employees destined in two years 
to be split into three new companies focused on agriculture, material 
sciences, and specialty products like nutrition and electronics.145 That is 
despite the fact that the last unit DuPont spun off—the chemicals unit 
spun off in part as an effort to appease activists—lost three quarters of 
its value in less than a year after its separation.146 
B. THE DUPONT HYPOTHETICAL 
Consider what would have happened if DuPont had passed a 
sunlight bylaw, and Trian exceeded its thresholds but flaunted it. 
1. Detection of the Activists 
In DuPont, Trian first made its strategic proposals in June 2013 
and filed a Schedule 13F in August 2013, more than a year-and-a-
half before the stockholder vote. The Schedule 13F filing and other 
communications with Trian would have tipped DuPont off. 
Assuming it did not already have a sunlight bylaw in place, DuPont 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 59. 
 143. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K/A) (June 9, 2015). 
 144. Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Some Thoughts for Boards of 
Directors in 2016, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 9, 
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 145. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Remaking Dow and DuPont for the Activist 
Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
12/16/business/dealbook/remaking-dow-and-dupont-for-the-activist-shareholders.html 
[http://perma.cc/8ZZ5-LFMV]. 
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2016]                              TWO NEW TOOLS FOR                               515 
ADDRESSING ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS 
could have enacted one, and Trian would have faced the choice 
between complying or refusing to comply and having its strategic 
proposal and any director nominees become ineligible for the 
stockholder vote. Trian never reached the ownership threshold on its 
own that would have triggered an obligation to file a Schedule 13D 
or Schedule 13G, so there is a question of whether it would reach the 
ownership threshold required under a sunlight bylaw. But that trigger 
could obviously be adjusted based on factors such as the size of a 
company measured in market capitalization, where, as was true of 
DuPont, 5% of the company’s outstanding shares cost billions. 
2. What a Sunlight Bylaw Might Have Revealed 
Consider what a sunlight bylaw might have revealed in the 
activist campaign against DuPont and why Trian might need to sue to 
invalidate it. 
Trian issued numerous white papers and press releases, but 
consider its last white paper before the stockholder vote. It begins 
with the disclaimer that “[n]either the Participants nor any of their 
affiliates shall be responsible or have any liability for any 
misinformation contained in any third party, SEC or other regulatory 
filing or other third party report” and “Trian [] disclaims any 
obligation to update the data, information or opinions contained in 
this presentation.”147 Query whether Trian is attempting to disclaim 
any obligation to be accurate in its own SEC filings about its 
holdings. Regardless, it plainly disclaims any obligation to update 
any information.148 
Trian attacks DuPont’s growth as purely cyclical, not driven by 
value added by management, and followed the common tactic of 
engaging in a highly detailed discussion of executive compensation 
under the title: “Poorly Constructed Compensation Programs: High 
Annual Payouts Despite Poor Performance.”149 
                                                                                                                 
 147. TRIAN PARTNERS, DUPONT: A REFERENDUM ON PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/30554/000093041 
315000509/c80237_ex1.pdf [http://perma.cc/LLD4-DD6P]. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 16. Activist hedge funds commonly attack executive compensation. See, 
e.g., Liz Hoffman, Activist Funds Put Executive Pay Formulas Under Microscope, 
 
516 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Although Trian need not disclose its principals’ compensation or its 
annual yields, one can compare DuPont’s disclosures to news reports. 
According to DuPont’s 2014 Proxy, in 2013, its then-Chairman and 
CEO Ellen Kullman earned about $12.5 million while its stock price 
increased by about 42%; 150  according to its 2015 Proxy, in 2014, 
Kullman earned about $12 million while its stock price increased 
16%.151  According to Forbes—again, the best one can do—in 2013, 
Trian’s principal Nelson Peltz earned $430 million while the fund 
yielded about 40%;152 in 2014, Peltz earned $170 million while the fund 
yielded about 11%.153 In other words, for generating an average yield in 
2013 through 2014 that was less than DuPont’s, Peltz earned average 
compensation that exceeded DuPont’s CEO’s by over twenty-four 
times. 
Trian touts the $11.3 billion of assets under its management,154 but 
consider what this might mean for Trian’s guaranteed income. Under the 
“standard compensation structure . . . hedge fund managers charge 
annually 2% of the assets under management plus a performance fee of 
20%.” 155  Two percent of $11.3 billion in assets under management 
would result in a fixed, annual management fee of about $226 million, 
suggesting compensation for its executives not directly tied to 
performance that dwarfs that of executive management at DuPont. 
Trian also recites its long-term investments in Wendy’s, Tiffany’s, 
Heinz, and Family Dollar.156 But this selective recitation of examples is 
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not a catalogue of its prior holding periods after every intervention, does 
not disclose its percentage annual portfolio turnover, and is nothing 
close to the detailed information DuPont must report about its assets 
annually and update quarterly under the securities laws. 
Trian also touts its ownership of about $1.9 billion in DuPont 
shares compared to about $20 million in shares owned by 
management.157 But that, of course, appears to be only about 17% of 
Trian’s assets, and many DuPont directors and executives likely have a 
far higher percentage of their wealth tied to DuPont’s future. 
To the extent that the discussion here of news reports concerning 
Trian is much more general or based on less reliable sources than 
Trian’s discussion of DuPont, that is because of the disclosure 
asymmetry. The information culled from Trian’s disclosures and news 
reports simply hints at the size and direction of what might be gleaned 
from disclosures under sunlight bylaws. 
Even this superficial review, reveals that Trian’s investment and the 
compensation and incentives of its decision-makers likely do not 
comport with the incentives assumed by Professors Brav and Bebchuk. 
Knowing this, Trian may well have sued to invalidate any sunlight 
bylaw. 
DuPont should win. 
3. DuPont’s Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws 
As explained, a sunlight bylaw would have been consistent with the 
DGCL. It also would have been consistent with DuPont’s certificate of 
incorporation and bylaws. 
DuPont’s certificate of incorporation states that subject to the 
power of stockholders to make and repeal bylaws, the board has the 
power “to make By-laws; and, from time to time, to alter amend or 
repeal any By-laws.”158 DuPont’s bylaws specify that a special meeting 
requested by stockholders will not be held if the business proposed “is 
not a proper subject for stockholder action under applicable law” and 
“[b]usiness transacted at all special meetings shall be limited to the 
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matters stated in the Company’s notice” or stockholder business 
proposed in compliance with the bylaws.159 DuPont’s bylaws require 
stockholders to give advanced notice of any such business from 90 to 
120 days before the meeting, and any violation prohibits the business 
from being considered.160 Finally, the bylaws confirm that a majority 
board vote can adopt, amend, or repeal the bylaws.161 A sunlight bylaw 
would be consistent with DuPont’s certificate of incorporation and 
bylaws. 
4. Validity of the Sunlight Bylaw As Applied 
In Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, (“Sotheby’s”), the court upheld the 
rights plan designed by Wachtell Lipton with thresholds based on 
Schedule 13D filings to protect Sotheby’s from the threat of creeping 
control.162 There, Vice Chancellor Parsons applied the Unocal standard 
of review and rejected the more stringent standard urged by the 
activist,163 but this Article will examine them under the most stringent 
standard. That analysis, of course, applies with even greater force under 
the Unocal standard. 
Chief Justice Strine, while a Vice-Chancellor, interpreted Delaware 
Supreme Court precedent governing an incumbent board’s power to 
pass bylaws affecting voting rights as requiring the incumbent board to 
show: (1) “a legitimate corporate objective served by its decision,” (2) 
“that their motivations were proper and not selfish,” (3) “that their 
actions were reasonable in relation to their legitimate objective,” and (4) 
that their actions “did not preclude the stockholders from exercising 
their right to vote or coerce them into voting a particular way.”164 Even 
harkening back to the most restrictive view of the board’s ability to pass 
bylaws affecting voting rights in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 
does not change the analysis.165 According to Blasius, a board cannot act 
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“for the primary purpose of preventing or impeding an unaffiliated 
majority of shareholders from expanding the board and electing a new 
majority,” without satisfying the difficult burden of “demonstrating a 
compelling justification for such action.”166 
A properly drafted and administered sunlight bylaw serves the 
legitimate corporate objective of promoting disclosure that would enable 
other stockholders and the board to better evaluate activist hedge funds’ 
incentives and proposals. The fit between means and ends is reasonable 
because it requires the disclosure of readily available information, it 
cannot be shown to deter a material amount of beneficial activism, it 
might lead to more beneficial activism, and it regulates process rather 
than dictating an outcome. 
The sunlight bylaw enhances the stockholder’s franchise, rather 
than detracting from it. It allows other stockholders to evaluate not only 
any facts creating potential agency issues for the company’s board and 
executive management, but also information relevant to potential 
conflicts of interest between the activist hedge fund managers and other 
stockholders. Chief Justice Strine has explained why enhancing Section 
13(d)’s disclosure requirements would promote better stockholder 
decision-making and enhance their electoral rights: 
If [Bebchuk’s] argument is there is no reason to fear that hedge 
funds or other activist investors can threaten long-term value 
because longer-term investors will hold the balance of voting power, 
it logically follows that the voting electorate should have up-to-date, 
complete information about the economic interests of a hedge fund 
holding a large bloc of a corporation’s shares and proposing that the 
corporation make business strategy changes it is suggesting. 
Precisely how “long” the fund’s investment in the company is and in 
what manner the hedge fund is long is relevant information for the 
electorate to consider in evaluating the hedge fund’s interest. So is 
how “long” the activist is committed to owning its shares. This is 
consistent with Bebchuk and his allies’ belief that corporate 
managers should fully disclose their interests. When an investor is 
seeking to influence corporate strategies, especially by seeking status 
as a fiduciary or by using threat of an election campaign to gain 
concessions, that investor is taking action that affects all the 
company’s investors. If the electorate is to play the role Bebchuk 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. at 652, 661. 
520 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
envisions, he should support requirements to make sure that up-to-
date, complete information about the proponents’ economic holdings 
and interests is available.167 
His analysis applies with equal force to a sunlight bylaw passed and 
approved by the elected DuPont board. 
The sunlight bylaw would also facilitate decision-making by the 
board of directors. Vice Chancellor Laster has explained that “[u]nder 
the DGCL, unless a Delaware corporation provides otherwise in its 
certificate of incorporation, its existence is perpetual.”168 He concluded 
that “[t]he directors’ fiduciary duties therefore require that they 
maximize the value of the corporation over the long term for the benefit 
of the providers of longterm (i.e., presumptively permanent) capital.”169 
Although basing fiduciary duties on a perpetual existence may stir up 
some controversy,170 the directors must consider the impact of a strategic 
proposal on net present value. In doing so, they are entitled to consider 
facts bearing on the implications of strategic proposals for the company 
and its stockholders over time frames longer than the average activist’s 
investment.171 
DuPont could point to substantial additional support in Delaware 
case law to argue that its sunlight bylaw was equitable and lawful. 
First, the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that a company 
may create the freedom to resist short-term pressures and focus on long-
term value. In Williams v. Geier, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld, 
under the business judgment rule, a stockholder-approved 
recapitalization plan granting ten votes per share to stockholders who 
owned as of the record date and one vote per share to their subsequent 
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transferees until they had held the stock for three years.172 The Delaware 
Supreme Court recognized that the board recommended the plan to, 
among other things, “[m]aintain ability to maximize long-term value,” 
“[p]rotect long-term commitment to continued growth and investment,” 
and “[r]educe [the] level of exposure to raiders seeking to capitalize on 
corporate vulnerability due to short-term business cycles.” 173  Even 
though the recapitalization would have “the effect of strengthening” a 
family’s long-standing and majority interest in the company, the court 
found there was no evidence the board was interested, entrenching itself, 
or controlled by the family, and therefore the board’s recommendation 
passed muster under the business judgment rule.174 
Second, the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized the need for 
the board to have an orderly process before a stockholder vote that 
ensures the quality of director nominees. In Stroud v. Grace, the 
Delaware Supreme Court upheld, under the business judgment rule, 
stockholder-approved changes to the certificate of incorporation and 
bylaws regulating the disclosures by and qualifications of nominees for 
board positions.175 The bylaw required stockholders proposing a board 
candidate to include in the notice of nomination submitted no less than 
fourteen days before the stockholder vote a statement of how the 
nominee qualified and empowered the board to prevent unqualified 
nominees from running.176 The Delaware Supreme Court held that it did 
not present such a severe, hypothetical risk of injury to the stockholders’ 
franchise it had to be stricken down.177 In the bylaw, the incumbent 
board reserved the discretion to make the subjective judgment about 
whether certain candidates “had substantial experience in line . . . 
positions in the management of substantial business enterprises or 
substantial private institutions.”178 But the Stroud court emphasized “our 
entire legal system makes liberal use of the word ‘substantial’ and its 
derivatives as a qualifier in a broad range of rules and statutes.”179 
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Third, Delaware courts have recognized the importance of 
improving board and stockholder decision-making. In Kidsco Inc. v. 
Dinsmore, the company had entered a stock-for-stock merger 
agreement. 180  Days before the stockholder vote on the merger, a 
competing bidder disclosed a tender offer and an intent to solicit 
stockholders to demand a special meeting to replace the current board 
with members who would dismantle the rights plan.181 The company 
negotiated with the original merger partner to increase consideration, but 
time was short, and the company therefore passed a bylaw amendment 
enlarging the time in which to respond to any stockholder demand for a 
proxy vote on replacing the directors by about twenty-five days.182 The 
Delaware Chancery Court upheld the bylaw amendment and rejected an 
entrenchment argument because the bylaw would only leave the board 
in place for an additional twenty-five days, would enable the board to 
negotiate the highest and best offer in the stock-for-stock merger and 
consider alternatives, and would not perpetuate the board members’ 
positions in office for an extended period.183 The Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion.184 
The sunlight bylaw would promote the goal of providing 
information to the board and other stockholders so they have the option 
of considering the impact of the strategic proposal over time, would 
allow the strategic proposal or nominee to go to a stockholder vote 
without delay if the activist complied, and would only prevent particular 
issues or nominees from being considered at the vote if violated. And, 
although the sunlight bylaw would reference materiality, the word 
material is as common as the word substantial in our legal system, and 
the sunlight bylaw contains many other, more objective measures of 
compliance. Cases striking down bylaws for entrenching incumbents are 
far afield.185 
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Trian could argue that by deferring their proposals or nominees, the 
board was effectively denying them, but that would be a 
mischaracterization. Sunlight bylaws are agnostic to the content of the 
investor proposal. To obtain a stockholder vote, the investor need only 
make the required disclosures. If the activist made an otherwise 
appropriate disclosure slightly late and with a good excuse, the company 
could approve it and there might be no delay or it might well be as short 
as the twenty-five days in Kidsco. If the board acted with alacrity and 
sensitivity to its obligations to the stockholders and to ensure a process 
that enables orderly consideration of strategic proposals and nominees, it 
would enhance the other stockholders’ rights. 
Trian might argue that the remedy is akin to that for violating an 
advanced notice bylaw and the same constraints should apply. Advance 
notice bylaws, which are common, usually require prospective nominees 
for the board and stockholders proposing business or governance 
changes to submit certain information at least sixty days before the 
stockholders’ meeting and vote.186 “Advance notice bylaws are often 
construed and frequently upheld as valid,” and “function to permit 
orderly meetings and election contests and to provide fair warning to the 
corporation so that it may have sufficient time to respond to shareholder 
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nominations.” 187  While they are stricken down when they “unduly 
restrict the stockholder franchise or are applied inequitably,”188 sunlight 
bylaws promote rather than restrict the franchise, and boards can 
exercise care when determining whether to approve belated disclosures 
under the sunlight bylaw and to permit the issue to go to a stockholder’s 
vote. 
The activists might calculate that if they published sunlight bylaw 
disclosures months or years into their campaign but shortly before the 
stockholder vote, then the board would be compelled to put their 
proposal or nominees on the ballot. Such belated disclosure, however, 
would defeat the point of the sunlight bylaw. The Delaware Chancery 
Court found that a board properly refused to waive the requirements of 
an advance notice bylaw where it found “it would be unfair to the 
remaining stockholders” and “if it did issue a waiver, the bylaws would 
lack meaning.”189 Waiving belated compliance with a sunlight bylaw 
could also be unfair to other stockholders who assumed compliance was 
required and could defeat the purpose of requiring disclosures 
sufficiently in advance of the vote for other stockholders to consider the 
information, but the board’s decision should and would hinge on actual 
facts in a specific case. 
5. A Rights Plan 
The DuPont board might still need to enact a rights plan, although 
Trian’s campaign does not appear to have been based on the sort of 
vote-buying found in Sotheby’s. The pace of the campaign and the 
increase in ownership by a lead activist and its allies might force the 
company to do so. And, of course, the rights plan could use Schedule 
13D filings and any information from sunlight bylaw disclosures to 
determine the thresholds. 
But in such a case, any analysis of the validity of the sunlight bylaw 
and the rights plan should distinguish between the two instruments. The 
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sunlight bylaw encourages disclosure and a better process for board and 
stockholder decision-making. It is not a defensive or protective device 
and should not be confused with one, even though it can provide 
information to the company before it adopts a rights plan and inform 
how it tailors the rights plan. Depending on the pace of the activist share 
purchases, their ownership levels, and the content of their strategic 
proposal, a rights plan with thresholds sensitive to sunlight bylaw 
disclosures may be necessary and equitable. 
And any additional disclosure combined with a more tailored rights 
plan would allow the Delaware courts to draw finer distinctions and 
plumb more deeply into what happened in the activist campaign in any 
litigation. Lawyers draft initial discovery requests based on publicly-
available information and information from their clients. Expedited 
discovery and trials are common in Delaware. Absent any reporting 
under a sunlight bylaw, the identities of at least some wolf pack 
members lurking below Section 13(d)’s reporting thresholds will 
probably remain unknown at least until the depositions of those working 
for the lead activist, after completing the bulk of document discovery, 
and too late to depose any employees or representatives of those 
members. Time will likely not permit connecting all the dots. The 
financial interests and incentives of the entire wolf pack may never be 
uncovered in discovery or presented to any court. Asymmetrical public 
disclosure thus has a path-dependent effect on the scope of litigation 
discovery and the record before the court. 
In the long run, if compliance with sunlight bylaws became routine, 
developing this information in the public sphere would then lead to 
more complete records for deciding expedited cases in Delaware. 
VI. RECIPROCAL DISCLOSURES AS A FIRST STEP 
“The [nuclear] bomb may have ended [World War II] but radar 
won it.”190 So said many radar researchers and workers in August 1945, 
when the news of the atomic bomb upstaged a planned Time magazine 
cover story about the MIT Radiation Laboratory’s part in the war 
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effort.191 That concept is not lost on activist hedge funds, which have 
used the information public companies are rightly required to disclose as 
a weapon while operating in the shadows, without disclosure. The 
activist hedge funds would likely not give up that advantage readily, and 
they could create two principal risks for boards that implement sunlight 
bylaws—litigation risks and the risk of a proxy fight. 
Although, as explained, sunlight bylaws should pass muster under 
Delaware law, they would likely precipitate litigation. In a recent 
decision, the Delaware Chancery Court refused to dismiss a claim under 
Unocal for the passage of bylaws that required the disclosure of options 
and short interests by shareholders requesting special meetings, 
submitting nominations, or submitting strategic proposals and vesting 
substantial authority in the chair at the meeting.192 The court reasoned 
that “the reasonableness of a defensive response whose munitions 
include the ability to foreclose the use of special meetings to hold 
elections requires an explanation not evident on the face of these 
pleadings.”193 The validity of sunlight bylaws as-applied would therefore 
likely turn on specific facts in the context of an as-applied challenge, 
and passing them would create litigation risk. 
Sunlight bylaws might also precipitate a proxy fight and alienate 
important institutional stockholders. Professor Allaire and Dauphin 
found that the most popular hedge fund tactic was to publicly criticize 
companies, which is successful 59% of the time, and that although 
activist hedge funds more rarely threaten or launch proxy contests, 
doing so leads to success over 80% of the time.194 In part, that is because 
76% of institutional investors have favorable views of shareholder 
activism, and 84% believe it adds value.195 
Certain institutional investors also opposed Wachtell Lipton’s 
proposal to expand reporting requirements under Section 13(d), citing a 
fear that accelerated, public reporting requirements would deter 
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beneficial activism.196  ISS—one of the two principal proxy advisory 
firms—has also opposed advanced notice bylaws that would require 
enhanced disclosures surrounding director nominees’ outside sources of 
compensation for service as a director.197 
Support for activist hedge funds means that that—rightly or 
wrongly—any board that passed a sunlight bylaw might well face a 
revolt at the next proxy vote. Consider then reciprocal disclosures as an 
alternative, which should be more palatable to institutional investors 
wary about deterring beneficial activism. 
Boards, institutional investors, and proxy advisory firms should 
request that activist hedge funds making strategic proposals also 
disclose the information required to be disclosed under sunlight bylaws 
voluntarily. Much like Schedule 13F disclosures, public companies 
could entertain requests for time-limited confidential treatment or any 
other lawful form of confidential treatment. Simply delaying the 
disclosure until some twenty days after the activist hedge fund publicly 
announces its strategic proposal would allow it to reap the benefits of 
the short-term abnormal returns that some theorize as necessary to 
incentivize beneficial activism. 
The reciprocal disclosures would focus on issues of acute interest to 
institutional stockholders. Institutional investors have recently signaled 
that they—unsurprisingly—wish to make the best decision on the merits 
to promote long-term value. In 2015, Blackrock’s CEO Laurence Fink 
wrote about “the importance of taking a long-term approach to creating 
value” while emphasizing that “some activist investors take a long-term 
view and have pushed companies and their boards to make productive 
changes.”198 Vanguard’s CEO wrote that, as the holder of about 5% of 
every publicly-traded stock in the United States, Vanguard believes that 
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boards have an obligation to engage with and listen to activist hedge 
funds but “it doesn’t mean that the board should capitulate to things that 
aren’t in the company’s long-term interest.” He also wrote that 
Vanguard is focused on “[s]hareholder voting rights that are consistent 
with economic interests” and “[s]ensible compensation tied to 
performance.”199 Queries to activist hedge funds about their investment 
horizons, portfolio turnover, the percentage of their assets the 
investment represents, communications with their supporters, the 
correlation between their economic interests and voting rights, and fund 
manager’s compensation go to the heart of these issues. As explained, 
recent empirical evidence suggests that activist hedge funds that acquire 
a higher stake generate higher returns, presumably because the market 
cares about their incentives, or better incentives lead to better strategic 
proposals. All of the other facts bearing on their incentives identified in 
the proposed sunlight bylaws should also influence votes. 
And a recent survey of institutional investors showed that 29% 
have holding periods of six months to two years while 71% have 
holding periods of over two years.200 88% of these institutional investors 
also perceive excessive executive compensation or inadequate corporate 
governance as somewhat to very important triggers for hedge fund 
activism, although, as explained, interventions to address those issues 
are seldom followed by significant improvements in operating 
performance or share price. 201  Again, requiring activists to disclose 
information bearing on their incentives and investment horizons speaks 
directly to the issues on which the institutional investors are focused and 
the areas in which their interests and the activists’ may diverge. 
Reciprocal disclosures could be negotiated in a way that would 
pose no risk of reducing beneficial activism. When the activist first 
                                                                                                                 
 199. F. William McNabb III, Chairman and CEO, Vanguard, Getting to Know You: 
The Case for Significant Shareholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 24, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/ 
getting-to-know-you-the-case-for-significant-shareholder-engagement/ [http://perma.cc/ 
3MN3-QPWA]. 
 200. Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: 
The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, J. FINANCE 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 6), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15 
71046 [http://perma.cc/TF23-XEH4]. 
 201. Id. at 20. 
2016]                              TWO NEW TOOLS FOR                               529 
ADDRESSING ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS 
makes a strategic proposal to the company—particularly if it owns very 
little stock—the board could agree to treat any reciprocal disclosure 
confidentially for a period of time and the activist could then reap the 
full benefit of the short-term increase in share price in the forty days 
surrounding the filing of its Schedule 13D. Institutional investors, if not 
already requiring the disclosure of this information from activist hedge 
funds, should also do so. 
Public companies should carefully reserve the right to publish any 
questions that the activist hedge fund refuses to answer, any questions 
that it will answer but not permit disclosure of its answer, or its refusal 
to update answers as the campaign unfolds. If the activist hedge fund 
refuses to disclose this information or refuses to permit its public 
disclosure sufficiently before a stockholder vote, it provides a good 
indication it is unwilling to operate in the sun. That refusal, which the 
board could and should publicize if a proxy fight occurs, would speak 
volumes. 
According to political myth, when President Lyndon B. Johnson 
was running a tough campaign against a well-respected opponent for 
office in Texas, he instructed his campaign to spread the rumor that his 
opponent had sex with pigs. When one of his advisors complained that 
the story was false and no one would believe it, President Johnson said 
“I know, but let’s make [him] deny it.”202 Activist hedge fund campaigns 
are no less hard fought than political elections, and hedge funds often 
use harsh rhetoric to negatively characterize the voluminous information 
contained in public companies’ disclosures; it is a difficult task indeed 
for the public company to respond in a way that does not sound 
defensive; and any response by the public company only provides half 
of the necessary information. Information from the public company 
alone can seldom—if ever—answer whether the activist hedge fund 
manager is a better agent for long-term stockholders. 
Public companies must at least ask the questions that would expose 
any inconsistencies, obscured by current disclosure laws, between what 
an activist hedge fund does and what it says. For example, activist hedge 
funds routinely grand-stand about excessive executive compensation at 
public companies, but, according to news reports, appear to award their 
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managers extremely lucrative compensation packages despite, at best, 
modest returns. At the very least, in response to a request for reciprocal 
disclosure, the activists should be forced to assert that their own 
compensation schemes are the finance equivalent of the secret formula 
for Coca-Cola and cannot be disclosed. If they do so, it will be more 
difficult for them to reasonably dismiss the argument that public 
companies need pay their executives well to attract and retain them. 
Reciprocal disclosures could also lay the groundwork for sunlight 
bylaws. The information disclosed by activist hedge funds under them 
could serve useful to academics, although keep in mind that activist 
hedge funds will likely avoid disclosing the most damaging information, 
so some limits to current disclosures will persist. Reciprocal disclosures 
will also allow public companies, their lawyers, and their investment 
bankers to develop a body of experience with crafting such requests 
before enshrining reporting requirements in bylaws that are more 
difficult to pass, amend, and repeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Each activist hedge fund, each campaign, each strategic proposal, 
and each company is complex and unique. But the limits of current 
disclosure laws mean that, although much is publicly disclosed about the 
company, little is disclosed about the hedge funds. Those limits prevent 
boards from evaluating activists’ proposals and incentives on a case-by-
case basis with the required speed. Wearing blinders, the board is thus 
forced to choose among fighting, capitulating, or something in between. 
Making such decisions on materially incomplete information advances 
no one’s interests but those of the activists. If boards or stockholders 
decide to pass sunlight bylaws or request reciprocal disclosures so that 
those who seek to wield power have a fraction of the disclosure 
obligations imposed on those with responsibility, then those judgments 
should be respected. 
